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ABSTRACT
Secure communication is difficult to arrange between devices
that have not previously shared a secret. Previous solutions to
the problem are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, require additional hardware for out-of-band communication, or
require an extensive public-key infrastructure. Furthermore,
as the number of wireless devices explodes with the advent
of the Internet of Things, it will be impractical to manually
configure each device to communicate with its neighbors.
Our system, CloseTalker, allows simple, secure, ad hoc
communication between devices in close physical proximity,
while jamming the signal so it is unintelligible to any receivers
more than a few centimeters away. CloseTalker does not
require any specialized hardware or sensors in the devices,
does not require complex algorithms or cryptography libraries,
occurs only when intended by the user, and can transmit a
short burst of data or an address and key that can be used
to establish long-term or long-range communications at full
bandwidth.
In this paper we present a theoretical and practical evaluation of CloseTalker, which exploits Wi-Fi MIMO antennas
and the fundamental physics of radio to establish secure communication between devices that have never previously met.
We demonstrate that CloseTalker is able to facilitate secure
in-band communication between devices in close physical
proximity (about 5 cm), even though they have never met
nor shared a key.

A1#
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d2#

Target'device'

Sending'device'

Figure 1: A multiple-antenna ‘sending’ device uses
antenna 𝐴1 to send a data signal to a ‘target’ device
located at distance 𝑑1 , while antenna 𝐴2 located 𝑑2
from the target transmits jamming.
envisioned to share data and control information among themselves, some of which may be privacy sensitive or have security
implications. With so many IoT devices being deployed, people will find it increasingly inconvenient to configure and
connect new devices, or to arrange short-lived contact with
the dozens of new devices they may encounter every day.
As one concrete illustration of this problem, imagine a
person who collects health-related data on a wearable device
and wants to show that data to her physician. The wearable
device has a limited display or no display whatsoever, making
it difficult or impossible for the patient and physician to view
the information together. There may, however, be a display in
the physician’s exam room and the goal is to get data securely
from the wearable to the display as shown in Figure 1. In
this scenario the two devices have never met nor shared a
key, but need to share sensitive medical information. If that
data were revealed, others may learn something about the
patient that the patient would prefer remain confidential.
There are many situations like this – where data must be
securely transferred to a newly encountered device in close
physical proximity, or where it is important to ensure data is
not accidentally exposed to distant devices. Creating secure
communication in these circumstances is difficult for several
reasons, including: (1) devices that have not been previously
encountered cannot be preconfigured with shared secrets,
(2) exchanging secrets over the air creates the possibility for
man-in-the-middle attacks, (3) manual secret entry becomes
increasingly impractical as the number of devices grows,
and (4) IoT devices often have limited or non-existent user
interfaces, making manual secret entry such as Bluetooth’s
Simple Secure Pairing difficult or impossible.
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INTRODUCTION

Analysts predict billions of everyday devices will soon become “smart” with the addition of wireless communication
capabilities [26]. These Internet of Things (IoT) devices are
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CloseTalker

relationship using traditional methods like TLS, with or
without an AP, with or without the Internet.

To enable secure communications where devices discover
each other in an ad hoc manner, we present a theoretical
and practical evaluation of a novel system called CloseTalker.
CloseTalker uses jamming to cover information exchanged
between a multiple-antenna ‘sending’ device and another
nearby ‘target’ device as shown in Figure 1. We use Wi-Fi to
demonstrate CloseTalker, but the technique could be adapted
for other protocols such as Bluetooth or Zigbee. CloseTalker
has the following attributes.

No need for additional hardware, pre-shared secrets, or
complex algorithms. Unlike other approaches, CloseTalker
does not require any specialized hardware in the target devices, any hardware to support out-of-band communication,
any pre-shared secrets, any complex algorithms or cryptography libraries, or any infrastructure such as access points
or PKI authorities. In fact, the receiving device need not be
aware that the sender is using CloseTalker’s techniques.

One antenna transmits data, another jams. The sending
device uses antenna 𝐴1 to transmit a data signal to the target
device located at distance 𝑑1 , while using a second antenna
𝐴2 located 𝑑2 from the target to broadcast barrage jamming
(random noise). Multiple antennas are becoming common in
mobile devices, and in fact multiple antennas are required to
take advantage of advanced features such as beam forming in
the Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO) configurations
of 802.11n [15] and 802.11ac [14].
To perform effective beam forming, antennas are typically
separated by one-half wavelength [27]. With Wi-Fi 2.4 GHz
devices, one-half wavelength is roughly 6.2 cm. Some devices
may simply be too small to support multiple antennas. In
these cases, the small device can act as a CloseTalker target,
but not a sender. We discuss a bi-directional communication
scenario in Section 7.

No additional network interference. CloseTalker conforms
to the Wi-Fi specification by performing Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) to avoid interference with other devices operating in an environment [15].
CloseTalker transmits both the data and jamming signals
simultaneously during the time a normal Wi-Fi device would
transmit only data. In this way CloseTalker does not create
additional interference for other devices.

1.2

Assumptions

We evaluate our system using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
receivers and assume either the target or the sender (or both)
can be moved so that the devices can be placed in close physical proximity, at least temporarily. We make the following
assumptions about the target device: 1) it has at least one
radio antenna to receive wireless data, 2) it might not have
sensors such as cameras, microphones or accelerometers, and
3) new hardware or software cannot be added.
We assume the transmitting device has: 1) a radio compatible with that of the target device, 2) at least two antennas
located approximately one-half wavelength apart, and 3) one
antenna can send data while a second antenna transmits barrage jamming. The transmitting device may also be adorned
with an indicator such as an arrow to reveal how to best
align the devices for maximum throughput (see Section 4).
Finally, we assume adversaries are located more than about
7 cm away. Adversaries face the same difficulties legitimate
devices face separating data from jamming. Our experimental results in Section 5 are for single-antenna COTS Wi-Fi
receivers only, but in Section 6 we examine CloseTalker’s theoretical security against adversaries with two antennas. We
do not present any experimental data regarding the resilience
of CloseTalker against attacks nor any analysis of it against
attacks using more than two antennas.

Inverse-Square Law protects data transfer. CloseTalker’s
multiple antennas, separated by one-half wavelength, create
a situation where the legitimate target device is able to
correctly receive the transmitted data, despite the presence
of jamming, while denying a more distant adversary the
ability to recover the data. Below we show that when a target
device is in close physical proximity (about 5 cm) to a sending
device, due to the Inverse-Square Law governing the physics
of radio signal propagation, the data signal can be received
with up to 50 times more strength than the jamming. This
arrangement ensures data is correctly received only by devices
that are in close physical proximity. More distant devices
receive roughly equal data and jamming strength, making
data recovery unlikely.
Meant for user-intended ad hoc encounters. CloseTalker is
intended to transfer data under jamming cover when a user
moves devices into close proximity and initiates communication by taking an action such as pressing a button on the
sending device. In this case, proximity combined with the
user’s deliberate action can serve as a root of trust between
devices that have not previously shared a secret.

1.3

Contributions

CloseTalker is a novel approach for securely transferring data
between adjacent devices, even though the devices have never
met, nor have any secrets been pre-shared. This paper makes
the following contributions:

Supports long-range and long-term data transfer, too. If the
amount of data to transfer is small, CloseTalker’s jamming
can cover the one-time data transfer. If the amount of data
to transfer is large, or devices need to communicate many
times or at long distances, CloseTalker can transfer a secret
key, which the two devices can then use to bootstrap a secure
data-transfer session or long-term / long-distance secure

(1) a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to transfer
any kind of information between commodity wireless
devices, regardless of device type or manufacturer, without hardware modifications to the devices,
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(2) a theoretical analysis of jamming at close range to
facilitate data transfer, and
(3) an experimental evaluation of the feasibility of using
CloseTalker to transfer data to unmodified receivers.

2

sharply defined. Instead, the electric E and magnetic H fields
generated by a transmitting antenna begin to align more
fully so that they are orthogonal (perpendicular) to each
other, transverse to the radial direction of propagation, as
the signal moves substantially into the far field.
Because the boundary is not sharp and CloseTalker is
designed for communications between devices separated by
approximately the estimated distance from Equation (1), we
cannot simply use Equation (2) to estimate signal strength
at the receiver because Equation (2) is only valid in the far
field.
Balanis, however, gives approximations for the E and H
fields and shows that they are valid everywhere, except on
the surface of the antenna, for a thin-wire (radius 𝑟 ≪ 𝑙)
finite-length dipole [5]:
[︃
]︃
𝑘𝑙
𝑘𝑙
𝐼0 𝑒−𝑗𝑘𝑑 cos( 2 cos 𝜃) − cos( 2 )
(3)
E ≃ 𝑗𝜂
2𝜋𝑑
sin 𝜃
[︃
]︃
𝑘𝑙
)
𝐼0 𝑒−𝑗𝑘𝑑 cos( 2 cos 𝜃) − cos( 𝑘𝑙
2
H≃𝑗
(4)
2𝜋𝑑
sin 𝜃
√
where 𝑗 = −1, 𝜂 = 120𝜋 is the intrinsic impedance of free
space, 𝐼0 is the current applied to the transmitter, 𝑘 = 2𝜋/𝜆
is the wavenumber, 𝑑 is the distance from the transmitting
antenna, and 𝜃 is the vertical angle between the transmitter
and receiver (below we assume 𝜃 = 𝜋/4 indicating the two
antennas are vertically aligned).
Given Equations (3) and (4), we can estimate the average
power density [5]:

RADIO SIGNAL PROPAGATION

In this section we review some background information useful for understanding CloseTalker’s strategy. CloseTalker’s
approach for overcoming jamming when devices are in close
physical proximity relies on the fact that radio waves attenuate proportionally with the distance the signal travels.
CloseTalker’s insight is that the signal from the nearby data
antenna can be sufficiently stronger than the signal from the
farther jamming antenna for the receiver to recover the data
signal despite the presence of jamming, while a more distant
adversary cannot. The nature of the signal, however, depends
on the distance between transmitter and receiver. When a
receiver is extremely close to a transmitter, the receiver is
said to be in the near field of the transmitter. At longer
range, the receiver is said to be in the far field (also called
the Fraunhofer region).
The boundary between the near and far field for a finitelength transmitting dipole antenna is estimated at distance
𝑑 from the antenna as follows [5]:
2𝐷2
(1)
𝜆
where 𝐷 is the length of the transmitting antenna plus the
length of the receiving antenna, and 𝜆 is the signal wavelength.
Equation (1) projects that the far field for quarter-wavelength
antennas at Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band begins at roughly 6.2 cm
and is as short as 3.1 cm for Wi-Fi’s 5 GHz band.1 This
boundary is not sharp, but instead transitions gradually
between the near and far fields.
In the far field radio waves attenuate proportionally to the
square of the distance between the transmitter and receiver.
This signal propagation relationship is captured in the far
field by the well-known Friis transmission model [27]:
(︂
)︂2
𝜆
𝑃 𝑟 = 𝑃 𝑡 𝐺𝑡 𝐺𝑟
(2)
4𝜋𝑑
𝑑=

1
ℜ[E × H* ].
(5)
2
where ℜ is the real component of these complex numbers and
*
is the complex conjugate.
Equation (5) suggests that power density drops with the
square of distance. If the distance 𝑑 between transmitter and
receiver is reduced by one-half, then the average received
power is increased by a factor of four. This relationship
between distance and power is often referred to as the Inverse
Square Law.
The relationship is particularly stark when a receiver is
in close proximity to a transmitter. Figure 2 shows the expected average power density according to Equation (5),
where transmitting antenna 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 are separated by a
fixed distance of one-half wavelength, and a receiver is located
𝑑1 cm away from 𝐴1 , such that 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 + 𝜆/2. Antenna 𝐴1
transmits a data signal while antenna 𝐴2 transmits barrage
jamming. Each antenna transmits at equal magnitude. In
this figure we model a 24 dBm Wi-Fi signal transmitted
on channel 1’s center frequency of 2.412 GHz, which has
wavelength 𝜆 ≈ 12.5 cm.
We see in Figure 2 that when a receiver is very close to a
transmitter, it receives a significantly stronger signal than a
signal from a transmitter located only one-half wavelength
farther away. In this case, when antenna 𝐴1 is located at
𝑑1 = 1 cm, then 𝑑2 ≈ 7.25 cm, that is, 7.25 times farther
than 𝑑1 . Because the power received is relative to the square
W𝑎𝑣 =

where 𝑃𝑟 is the power at the receiving antenna in milliwatts,
𝑃𝑡 is the power transmitted, 𝐺𝑡 is the gain of the transmitting
antenna, 𝐺𝑟 is the gain of the receiving antenna, 𝜆 is the
wavelength of the signal, and 𝑑 is the distance between the
transmitting and receiving antennas. From Equation (2) it is
clear that if the distance 𝑑 between transmitter and receiver
is reduced by one-half, then the received power is increased
by a factor of four.

2.1

Estimating signal power density at
close range

Equation (1) gives an estimate for the boundary between
the near and far field, but in reality the boundary is not
1

Some sources suggest the far field for short antennas (where 𝑙 ≪ 𝜆)
𝜆
are best approximated by 𝑑 = 2𝜋
which yields distances of 1.9 cm and
0.8 cm for the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands respectively.
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Average power density by distance

3.1

A1

The relationship between a signal and noise is captured by
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) [11]:

A2

200

Data signal strength and noise
intensity

𝑃𝑟
𝐸𝑠
𝐸𝑏
=
=
(6)
𝑁0 𝐵
𝑁0 𝐵𝑇𝑠
𝑁0 𝐵𝑇𝑏
where 𝑃𝑟 is the received power of the data signal, 𝑁0 is the
power spectral density of the noise, 𝐵 is the bandwidth, 𝐸𝑠
is the energy per symbol, 𝐸𝑏 is the energy per bit, 𝑇𝑠 is
the symbol time, and 𝑇𝑏 is the bit time. For pulse-shaping
systems such as Wi-Fi where 𝑇𝑠 = 𝑁/𝐵, Equation (6)
simplifies to SNR = 𝐸𝑠 /(𝑁0 𝑁 ) where 𝑁 is the number of
samples per symbol.
In the presence of barrage noise jamming, where the jammer interferes across the entire signal bandwidth (as opposed
to tone jamming where noise is only transmitted on specific
frequencies), the total power spectral density of the noise
becomes [17]:

mW / cm 2

SNR =

150
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10 12 14 16 18 20 25 30 50 100 150 200 250 300
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Figure 2: Expected power received from two transmitting antennas, each sending a 24 dBm signal,
with antenna 𝐴1 located at distance 𝑑1 cm from the
receiver and antenna 𝐴2 located 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 + 𝜆/2 from
the receiver.

𝑁𝑡 = 𝑁0 + 𝑁𝑗
(7)
where 𝑁𝑡 is the total noise power spectral density, 𝑁0 is the
power spectral density of any background noise, and 𝑁𝑗 is the
power spectral density of the barrage jamming. Accounting
for noise provides the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio
(SINR) where:

of distance, even though both transmitting antennas are
physically close to the receiver, the signal from 𝐴1 is roughly
50 times stronger than the signal from antenna 𝐴2 . The
difference in power between a signal sent from antenna 𝐴1 and
𝐴2 drops quickly as distance from the transmitter increases.
When 𝐴1 is more than about 7 cm away from the target, the
received signal strength from each transmitter is virtually
identical. A distant device therefore receives roughly equalstrength signals from each antenna.
When devices are in close proximity they enjoy a unique
channel advantage over devices located farther away. That
channel superiority vanishes quickly as devices move apart.
CloseTalker uses this channel advantage between nearby devices to provide secure communications while denying a more
distant adversary the ability to recover the data.

3

𝑃𝑟
𝑃𝑟
=
.
(8)
(𝑁0 + 𝑁𝑗 )𝐵
𝑁𝑡 𝐵
Equation (8) can be used to provide the SINR per symbol,
𝛾𝑠 [11]:
SINR =

𝛾𝑠 =

3.2

𝑃𝑟 𝑇𝑠
𝐸𝑠
𝐸𝑠
=
=
.
𝑁𝑡 𝐵𝑇𝑠
𝑁𝑡 𝐵𝑇𝑠
𝑁𝑡 𝑁

(9)

Modulation schemes

802.11a/g/n/ac uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) [15] to send data symbols over several
different subcarriers simultaneously, resulting in higher data
rates than serial single-channel communications. Speed can
be further enhanced with the type of modulation used on each
subcarrier. In Wi-Fi the simplest modulation type is Binary
Phase Shift Keying (BPSK), where each symbol represents
one bit. More complex than BPSK, Quadrature Phase Shift
Keying (QPSK) symbols represent two bits of information.
Finally, Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (𝑀 QAM) is the
most complex Wi-Fi modulation type where each symbol represents log2 (𝑀 ) bits and 𝑀 is 16, 64, or 256. More complex
modulation schemes increase the data rate because each symbol represents more bits. Figure 3 shows these modulation
types in a constellation diagram where a symbol, representing
one or more bits, is shown as a dot in the complex plane.
To send a symbol, a transmitter selects the complex number on the constellation diagram representing the desired bit
pattern, then modulates a cosine wave on a carrier frequency
with the real component of the complex number, and also
modulates a sine wave on the same carrier frequency with

SIGNAL ERRORS

The performance of wireless digital communication systems
carrying data in the presence of noise (both natural and
intentional) has been well studied and has produced analytical models that predict the number of communication
errors expected to occur given three factors: 1) data signal
strength, 2) noise intensity, and 3) modulation scheme. In
this section we use those models to calculate the theoretical
error rates given the physical arrangement of transmitter
and receiver described in Section 2 where a target device is
located near data antenna 𝐴1 and one-half wavelength farther from jamming antenna 𝐴2 . In Section 5 we present the
results from experiments using real, commercial-off-the-shelf
Wi-Fi receivers.
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Table 1: Probability of symbol error 𝑃𝑠 by modulation type.

I

3.3
Figure 3: Wi-Fi constellation diagrams. Dots represent symbols in the complex plane.
the imaginary component of the complex number. In this
way the transmitter can send both the real and imaginary
component of the complex number simultaneously on a single
radio frequency.
After compensating for channel effects, the receiver receives
the signal according to the Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) model as:
𝑦[𝑡] = 𝑥[𝑡] + 𝑛[𝑡]

Energy per bit

The MCS influences the energy per bit because a symbol may
represent many bits, and each bit may be duplicated. Taking
the energy per symbol from Equation (9) as a constant, the
bit redundancy yields the SINR per bit, 𝛾𝑏 [11]:
𝛾𝑠
𝛾𝑏 ≈
(11)
𝑅𝑐 log2 𝑀
where log2 𝑀 is the number of bits per symbol and 𝑅𝑐 is the
coding rate (e.g., 1/2). There is a trade off in Equation (11):
as the number of bits per symbol increases, the energy per
data bit deceases, but as the coding scheme produces more
redundant bits, the energy per data bit increases.

(10)

3.4

where 𝑦[𝑡] is the received signal, 𝑥[𝑡] is the transmitted signal,
and 𝑛[𝑡] is the noise on the channel at time 𝑡.
The receiver then determines the nearest symbol to 𝑦[𝑡]
on the complex plane. Because 𝑦[𝑡] includes noise, it may not
fall exactly on a symbol, so the receiver chooses the closest
symbol and infers that symbol is what the transmitter sent.
Using a more complex modulation increases the susceptibility
to noise because there are more possible symbols and smaller
amounts of noise can cause the receiver to misinterpret a
symbol corrupted by noise.
To compensate for noise, Wi-Fi uses convolutional coding to create redundancy by adding duplicate bits to each
transmission. For example, 1/2 coding means that each bit
is duplicated, resulting in 2 bits for every input bit. Coding
redundancy reduces the overall data rate (e.g., 1/2 coding
reduces the data rate by half), but can improve throughput
by increasing reliability, especially in noisy environments.
A modulation type combined with a coding scheme is
known as a Modulation Coding Scheme (MCS). 802.11g can
use one of eight different schemes: BPSK 1/2, BPSK 3/4,
QPSK 1/2, QPSK 3/4, 16QAM 1/2, 16QAM 3/4, 64QAM
2/3, and 64QAM 3/4. 802.11n and 802.11ac can use these
modulation schemes as well, but can also use more complex
modulation schemes. In Section 5, however, we see that more
complex schemes cannot survive the jamming from antenna
𝐴2 , so we focus on these eight modulation coding schemes.

Estimating errors

Assuming an AWGN channel between sender and receiver,
that all symbols in a modulation scheme are equally likely
to be transmitted, and that Gray coding is used, so that one
symbol error corresponds to one bit error (a conservative
estimate, especially for complex modulation schemes), we can
calculate the probability of a symbol error, 𝑃𝑠 . Goldsmith [11]
gives an excellent information-theoretic derivation of the error
estimate equations shown in Table 1 where the 𝑄 function is
∫︁ ∞
𝑥2
1
𝑄(𝑥) = √
(12)
𝑒− 2 𝑑𝑥.
2𝜋 𝑥
Table 1 indicates the probability of a symbol error depends
on the signal’s power relative to noise and the modulation
type chosen. Assuming Gray coding, we can also estimate
the probability of a bit error, 𝑃𝑏 , as
𝑃𝑏 ≈

𝑃𝑠
.
log2 𝑀

(13)

Next we use these estimates to predict the ability of
CloseTalker to successfully transmit data to nearby devices
while denying more distant devices.

4

THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE

Section 3 provided the mathematical underpinning to estimate CloseTalker’s theoretical performance. In this section we
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Figure 5: Probability of symbol error by MCS for
devices in close proximity.

Figure 4: Energy per bit vs. noise at close range.
use those equations to model CloseTalker’s expected performance and in Section 5 we provide the results of experiments
using COTS Wi-Fi devices. For all experiments and theoretical estimates we separate antennas 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 by one-half
wavelength, with 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 + 𝜆/2, and arbitrarily choose Wi-Fi
channel 1. We model jamming phase and amplitude using
a normal Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
standard deviation, 𝑋 ∼ 𝒩 (𝜇 = 0, 𝜎 2 = 1).
Table 1 shows that the key to estimating errors, regardless
of modulation scheme, is the ratio between the energy per
bit and the energy in the noise. For CloseTalker, that ratio is
primarily driven by two factors: 1) the geometry between the
target device and the sending device’s antennas, and 2) the
ratio of transmit power of the two antennas (there is of course
other noise in the environment; we model it at −92 dBm [13]
but it typically has little impact on the error estimates).
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receivers can be placed near the transmit antennas and easily
aligned to maximize 𝑑2 , leveraging the Inverse-Square Law,
whereas more distant or less geometrically aligned devices
will see a lower 𝛾𝑏 as shown in Figure 4a.

4.2

Jamming transmit power

Another factor that can affect the ratio of energy per symbol
to noise is the transmit power of the data and jamming signals.
We model the jamming transmit power as 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿 dBm,
where 𝛿 ∈ {0, 4}. In the first case the data and noise signal
transmit power are equal; in the second case the jamming
power is 4 dBm (2.5 times) higher than the data signal. In
this latter case, shown in Figure 4b, CloseTalker relies even
more heavily on the geometry and Inverse-Square Law to
ensure the receiver is able to recover the data signal in the
presence of more noise. If the legitimate target device is
placed near the data antenna, the received data signal can
still be almost 30 times stronger than the jamming signal.
Figure 5 plots the theoretical probability of a symbol error,
𝑃𝑠 , using the equations in Table 1 and the energy per bit to
noise, 𝛾𝑏 , when CloseTalker uses each of the eight modulation
schemes and the target is aligned with the transmit antennas.
We see symbols transmitted with the simpler modulation
types of BPSK and QPSK are more likely to be received
without error than the more complex 𝑀 QAM modulation
schemes.
Wi-Fi groups bits into frames for transmission. If a frame
contains 𝑏 bits, then the probability a frame is received
without error, 𝑃𝑓 , is:

Geometry

Geometry drives the ratio between signal and noise as shown
in Figure 4a. We estimate the received power of the data
signal, 𝑃𝑟 , using Equation (5) at distance 𝑑1 . We estimate the
noise power similarly, but using the transmit power 𝑃𝑗 from
jamming antenna 𝐴2 at distance 𝑑2 . Assuming that antenna
𝐴1 transmits data at the same strength that 𝐴2 transmits
jamming, due to redundancy in some modulation coding
schemes, when the target device is located near antenna 𝐴1 ,
the energy per bit will be up to 70 times stronger than the
jamming signal. That ratio is maximized when the target
device is located where 𝑑1 is small and the antennas are
aligned so that 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 + 𝜆/2 as shown in Figure 1.
We assume CloseTalker devices can be adorned with an
indicator such as an arrow to reveal how to align the devices.
If the target is not well aligned relative to the transmit
antennas, the ratio of signal strength to jamming will be
reduced, resulting in increased noise relative to the signal.
This works to CloseTalker’s advantage because legitimate

𝑃𝑓 = (1 − 𝑃𝑠 )𝑏/ log2 𝑀 .

(14)

Figure 6 shows 𝑃𝑓 for each modulation scheme, assuming
the frame contains a modest payload of 𝑏 = 1, 024 bits. We
see that frames are likely to be received without error for
BPSK and QPSK when the target is close (less than about
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yields a distance of roughly 70 m, only 10 times less than
when transmitted at high power, not the 100 times reduction
in range that one might have expected.
These calculations suggest that to avoid detection by an
adversary located less than 1 m away, the transmit power
will need to be reduced to an extremely low level. In theory,
reducing the transmit power to −50 dBm would result in a
−73 dBm received signal at 20 cm. While these calculations
suggest the possibility that extremely low power could be
helpful, there are two important considerations. First, an
adversary can use a high-gain directional antenna to boost
his receive range. A 9 dBi antenna would increase 𝐺𝑟 , making
the adversary’s effective range roughly one-half meter. Second,
environmental noise is likely to create significant issues for
the legitimate target device at these levels.
Even though reducing transmit power alone does not assure that a signal will not be recovered by a distant device,
lowering transmit power still makes an eavesdropping adversary’s task more difficult. In the next section we experiment
with commercial Wi-Fi devices and 4 dBm transmit power.

(b) P = P + 4 dBm

t
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Figure 6: Probability a frame is received without error, given a 1,024 bit frame.
5 cm), and the probability of receiving a frame without error
becomes extremely low at greater distances.
These estimates suggest that BPSK will likely be a good
candidate to securely and reliably transfer data to a device
in close physical proximity in the presence of jamming, while
denying a more distant eavesdropper. This distance limitation may also help mitigate innocent errors where data is
unintentionally transferred to a device located farther away
from the multiple-antenna device.

4.3

5

Data transmit power

Another possible approach to securely transferring data between two nearby devices is to lower the data transmit power
and naively hope that a more distant eavesdropper would not
able to receive the weak signal. Reducing the typical Wi-Fi
transmit power of approximately 24 dBm to 4 dBm would
reduce the transmit power by a factor of 100. Intuitively, that
approach appears to be an easy way to reduce an adversary’s
range by a factor of 100. Because the signal attenuates with
the square of distance, however, that is not the case. If we
know the minimum signal strength at which a device can
receive a signal, 𝑃𝑟 , and assuming the device is in the far field,
we can derive the maximum distance where a transmitted
signal is recoverable by re-writing Equation (2) as:

5.1
𝜆

𝑑=
4𝜋

√︁

EVALUATION

To test the ability of COTS Wi-Fi devices to receive a signal
in the presence of jamming, we tested four devices with electronics similar to those found in embedded devices: a Panda
Ultra Wireless N USB Adapter [23], an Edimax Nano EW7811Un [8], an external Alfa Networks AWUS036H [3], and
an internal Intel Ultimate N WiFi Link 5300 [16] connected
to a Planar Inverted-F antenna.
On the transmit side, we used two calibrated Ettus Research N210 Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)
radios [9], each connected to a quarter-wavelength dipole antenna to simulate a multiple-antenna device. One USRP transmitted data using the GNU Radio 802.11a/g/p transceiver
code developed by Bloessl [6], while the second USRP transmitted barrage jamming across the entire Wi-Fi 20 MHz
channel during frame transmission. This arrangement allowed
us to precisely control the signal strength and coordinate
the timing of both the data and the jamming signals. The
antennas were separated by one-half wavelength in keeping
with Figure 1. We conducted all experiments on Wi-Fi channel 1, used 4 dBm as transmit power for data, and either 4
or 8 dBm as transmit power for jamming.

Frame reception without jamming

We first tested the ability of the four COTS devices to receive
frames containing a 1,024-bit payload sent from the USRP
without the presence of jamming. In this test we transmitted
1,000 Wi-Fi frames for each of the eight modulation schemes,
with an interval of 100 ms between frames. To minimize
outside interference, we tested these receivers in a remote
indoor facility where there were no other Wi-Fi transmitters
within at least 100 meters. We found each commercial device
performed similarly; and for brevity, in this paper we report
the average results across all four devices.

(15)

𝑃𝑟
𝑃𝑡 𝐺𝑡 𝐺𝑟

where 𝑃𝑡 is the transmit power, 𝐺𝑡 and 𝐺𝑟 are the gain of
the transmitter and receiver respectively.
For example, if a system is able to recover a signal at
𝑃𝑟 = −73 dBm [13], and no obstacles attenuate a 24 dBm
signal, then by Equation (15), the received power will reach
the device’s minimum after the signal travels approximately
700 m. Dropping the transmit power to 4 dBm, however,
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Figure 8: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent on each MCS
when 𝑃𝑗 = 4 dBm.

Figure 7: Frame Reception Ratio for 1,000 packets
sent on each MCS.
Figure 7 shows the average Frame Reception Ratio (FRR) –
the number of frames received by the Wi-Fi device, divided
by the number of frames transmitted, for all four receivers
where 𝑑1 ranged from 1 to 12 cm. We see that the simpler
modulation schemes were received with significantly higher
probability than more complex modulation schemes, although
theory suggests all modulation schemes should be received
with nearly 100% FRR without jamming interference. Pierson et al., however, show that non-propagating energy near a
transmitting antenna can cause channel estimation errors [25].
These channel estimation errors in turn can cause frames
to fail CRC checks and these frames are dropped by COTS
Wi-Fi devices. The non-propagating energy dies out quickly
as distance increases and does not cause problems for devices
further than about 14 cm apart. Because CloseTalker is intended for communication between devices in close physical
proximity, however, these errors reduce the FRR and are
not modeled in Section 4. This reduced FRR is significantly
more pronounced for complex modulation schemes because
small channel-estimation errors often cause the receiver to
decode symbols incorrectly. Simpler modulation schemes are
more robust against these errors because symbols are spaced
further apart (see Figure 3).

5.2

BPSK 1/2
BPSK 3/4
QPSK 1/2
QPSK 3/4
16QAM 1/2
16QAM 3/4
64QAM 2/3
64QAM 3/4

0.8

NFRR

FRR

0.5

0

j

1

0.6

Normalized Frame Reception Ratio
P = 8 dBm
j

1

BPSK 1/2
BPSK 3/4
QPSK 1/2
QPSK 3/4
16QAM 1/2
16QAM 3/4
64QAM 2/3
64QAM 3/4

NFRR

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1

2

3

4

5 6 7 8
Distance d 1 cm

9

10 11 12

Figure 9: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent on each MCS
when 𝑃𝑗 = 8 dBm.

Frame reception with jamming

Next we tested the ability of the Wi-Fi devices to receive
frames in the presence of jamming. Figure 8 shows the average
FRR across all four devices when jamming signal strength was
equal to the data signal strength (i.e., 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑡 ), normalized
to the FRR when no jamming was present (we refer to this
ratio as NFRR). We see that BPSK 1/2, BPSK 3/4, and
QPSK 1/2 performed relatively well when 𝑑1 was less than
5 cm. More complex modulation schemes were received with
low probability at close range, and all modulation schemes
performed poorly at longer ranges. This is by design, as

CloseTalker’s purpose is to transfer data to nearby devices,
but not allow reception by more distant devices.
We then tested CloseTalker’s ability to transfer data to
nearby devices when the jamming signal was 2.5 times stronger
than the data signal (i.e., 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑡 + 4 dBm). Figure 9 shows
the results when 𝑑1 ranged from 1 to 12 cm. We see that
BPSK has some ability to transfer data in this environment
up to 3 cm, but all other schemes and distances had virtually
no reception. In all cases after 6 cm, no frames were received
using any modulation scheme.
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Figure 10: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent with
BPSK 1/2 vs predicted when 𝑃𝑗 = 4 dBm.

Figure 11: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent with
BPSK 1/2 vs predicted when 𝑃𝑗 = 8 dBm.

5.3

6

Actual performance vs. theory

Based on Section 3, we expect BPSK 1/2 to tolerate more
noise than other modulation schemes and consistent with
predictions, in Figure 8 and 9 we see that BPSK 1/2 actually does perform much better in the presence of jamming
than other modulation schemes. In Figure 10 we compare
BPSK 1/2 performance when the data and jamming strength
are equal (i.e., 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑡 ), with the theoretical performance
discussed in Section 4 and shown in Figure 6. We see that
actual performance follows the theoretical performance, but
lags somewhat because as discussed in Section 5.1, unmodeled near-field effects cause channel-estimation errors that in
turn lead to dropped frames that are not considered in Equation (14). We also examine the performance of BPSK 1/2
when the jamming signal is 2.5 times stronger than the data
signal (i.e., 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑡 + 4 dBM) in Figure 11. Here also we
see that the real world lags theory due to near-field effects.
Despite these differences, theory elucidates the real world.
In summary, we see that CloseTalker was able to use
BPSK 1/2 to provide communication in the presence of
jamming when the data and jamming signals are of equal
strength and the devices were closer than about 5 cm. No
data was recovered by devices at longer ranges. FRR at close
range, however, was lower than might otherwise be expected.
In cases where the application must transmit large amounts
of data, it should not rely CloseTalker’s jamming to cover the
entire transmission; instead, it can use CloseTalker to send a
secret key to the receiver in a single frame and the devices
could then use that key to bootstrap a secure connection
over standard protocols (such as TLS over TCP over Wi-Fi).
Even if the key needs to be retransmitted, due to low FRR, it
should be received with high probability after a few attempts;
we thus have no concern about the efficiency of CloseTalker
even when used for large data transmissions.

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF
SECURITY

In our threat model, we consider an adversary attempting to
eavesdrop or to inject frames during CloseTalker’s data transfer. We assume the adversary understands CloseTalker data
and jamming technique and is able to employ sophisticated
equipment. We argue below that the fundamental physics
of radio make it extremely unlikely even such an advanced
adversary will succeed, and a practical adversary would be
even less successful.

6.1

Eavesdropping

An adversary might attempt to eavesdrop on the data transferred between CloseTalker devices, but faces the same issues
legitimate devices face when trying to extract the data signal in the presence of the jamming signal. If the adversary
uses CloseTalker’s technique, the most favorable geometric
alignment for the adversary is the same as it is for legitimate
devices – where the jamming antenna is located farthest from
adversary as discussed in Section 4.1. We have demonstrated
above, however, that provided the adversary is located more
than about 7 cm away, the data and jamming signals received
by the adversary will be roughly equal, making signal recovery difficult. In fact, if the adversary is aligned such that the
jamming antenna is closer than the data antenna, the jamming signal could very well be stronger than the data signal.
Regardless of signal strength, an adversary might attempt to
separate the data and jamming signals with a directional antenna or with signal processing and MIMO antennas instead
of relying on the Inverse-Square Law as CloseTalker does.
6.1.1 Directional antennas. A directional antenna with a
narrow main lobe pointed precisely at the data antenna, but
excluding the jamming antenna, would allow the adversary to
receive the data signal only. CloseTalker’s antennas, however,
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Figure 12: Since CloseTalker’s antennas are separated by a half wavelength, an adversary located 1 m away and aligned with one of the
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When the transmitter and receiver are far apart, then 𝑑𝑖𝑘
is approximated by [32]
𝑑𝑖𝑘 = 𝑑 + (𝑖 − 1)∆𝑟 𝜆 cos 𝜑𝑟 − (𝑘 − 1)∆𝑡 𝜆 cos 𝜑𝑡

(18)

where 𝑑 is the distance between transmit antenna 1 and
receive antenna 1, 𝜑𝑡 , 𝜑𝑟 are the angle of incidence on the
transmit and receive antenna arrays respectively, and ∆𝑡 , ∆𝑟
represent the spacing between the transmit and receive antennas respectively, normalized to the signal wavelength as
illustrated in Figure 13.
If the channel matrix H is estimated accurately, has Rank
greater than 1, and is not ill-conditioned, an adversary may
be able to separate the data signal from the jamming. It can
be shown, however, that for line of sight environments where
the transmitter and receiver are much farther apart than
the distance between transmitting antennas (e.g., 𝑑 ≫ ∆𝑡 ),
and when the two transmit antennas are within one-half
wavelength of each other (as they are with CloseTalker), the
channel matrix H has Rank 1 [32]. This Rank suggests the
data and jamming signals cannot be separated.
Tippenhauer et al., however, exploited the fact that a receiver must be located at a significantly greater distance than
the transmit antenna spread to ensure the channel matrix
has Rank 1 [31]. They showed that by using a two-antenna
array at relatively close range, signals can be separated in
some cases (multipath signals can also create a full-Rank
matrix when a Rank 1 matrix might otherwise be expected).
Their analysis evaluated an adversary attempting to separate
a 400 MHz data signal sent by one antenna using simple
Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) from a jamming signal sent by
a second antenna separated by 15 cm or more. They showed
that it is theoretically possible to extract a signal with less
than a 20% bit error rate at ranges around two meters. In
practice, however, they often failed due to multipath effects
even with precise alignment of the antennas and control over
the position of every component.
Furthermore, separating Wi-Fi’s more complex modulation schemes, with greater bandwidth, at higher frequencies
and smaller antenna spreads is more difficult than separating

are only one-half wavelength apart and because the main
lobe expands with distance, the lobe will encompass both
antennas if the adversary is located a reasonable distance
away or is inline with CloseTalker’s antennas. For example,
as shown in Figure 12, an adversary located 1 m away and
bore-sighted on one of the CloseTalker’s antennas would need
to have a one-half beam width of 𝛼 =tan−1 (6.25/100) ≈ 3.5
degrees to avoid the signal from the jamming antenna.
A 0.5 m dish antenna operating at Wi-Fi frequencies would
have a one-half beam width of 8.1 degrees [5], far wider than
the width required to avoid the jamming if the adversary
is located only 1 m away. A more distant adversary would
need an even narrower beam width. Furthermore, because
at least one of the CloseTalker’s devices is typically mobile,
the exact orientation and location of devices is difficult to
predict a priori.
6.1.2 Signal processing and MIMO antennas. Alternatively,
an adversary might try sophisticated signal-processing techniques to separate the data from the jamming signal based
on an estimate of the channel between sender and receiver.
The environment between transmitter and receiver can be
represented mathematically as [32]
(16)

where y is the received signal, H models the channel between
sender and receiver, x is the transmitted signal, and w is
noise. The elements in channel matrix H are calculated as [32]
ℎ𝑖𝑘 = 𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑗2𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑘 /𝜆)

φt$

Figure 13: A transmitter with antennas 𝑇 𝑥1 and 𝑇 𝑥2
separated by ∆𝑡 and oriented with angle 𝜑𝑡 relative
to a receiver with antennas 𝑅𝑥1 and 𝑅𝑥2 separated by
∆𝑟 and oriented with angle 𝜑𝑟 relative to the transmitter. In a line of sight environment, the channel
between these two devices separated by distance 𝑑
and with ∆𝑡 < 𝜆/2 has Rank 1 when 𝑑 ≫ ∆𝑡 [32].

Adversary"

y = Hx + w

Δr$

(17)

where 𝑖 = 1 . . . number of receiving antennas, 𝑘 = 1 . . . 2 (one
for each of CloseTalker’s two transmit antennas), 𝑎 is an
attenuation factor based on the path length, 𝑑𝑖𝑘 is the path
length between transmit antenna 𝑘 and receive antenna 𝑖.
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7

simple low-frequency FSK signals with large antenna separation. Those researchers did not demonstrate the ability to
separate BPSK 1/2 Wi-Fi signals from jamming. In short,
it remains unproven that an eavesdropping attack using a
two-antenna receiver is feasible with Wi-Fi when the data
and jamming antennas are separated by less than one-half
wavelength. Attacks with more antennas are theoretically
feasible.

6.2

Above we discuss uni-directional communication – data moves
from a multiple-antenna device to a single-antenna target
device. Here we discuss bi-directional communication.
If the target device also has two antennas, bi-directional
communication is possible simply by reversing roles. If one
device only has one antenna, however, we posit that secure
bi-directional communications may still be possible. In this
case, the single-antenna device can alert the multiple-antenna
device that it has data to send and the multiple-antenna
device initiates jamming on one antenna while listening on its
other antenna. The single-antenna device can then monitor
the noise floor. When the noise floor rises above a preset
threshold, strong jamming is in place and it then transmits its
data. In this way, a single-antenna device can bi-directionally
communicate with a multiple-antenna device.
This approach, however, has some limitations. If the adversary is able to raise the noise floor above a threshold, the
adversary may be able to trick the single-antenna device. The
adversary could time his jamming such that after reaching
the threshold on the single-antenna device, the adversary
stops jamming just as the single-antenna device transmits. In
this case the data is transmitted without jamming coverage.
To counter this attack, however, the single-antenna device
could wait a random amount of time after the noise threshold
is reached before sending the data. This way if the adversary
stopped jamming, the single-antenna device would detect it.

Frame injection

An adversary may attempt to inject his own frames while data
is transferred between CloseTalker devices. In that case the
adversary’s signal would have to exceed the jamming strength.
Because the jamming is in close proximity to the receiving
device, the Inverse-Square Law helps CloseTalker defend
against such an injection attack. Even though CloseTalker
transmits at 4 dBm, an adversary located only 2 m away
using a 9 dBi omni-directional antenna would need to roughly
double the maximum transmit power limits set by the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission to exceed CloseTalker’s
signal strength. While this transmit power is possible, it is well
above the capabilities of commercial off-the-shelf hardware.

6.3

BI-DIRECTIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS

Raising the bar for an adversary

Although CloseTalker does not make it impossible for an
adversary to eavesdrop or to inject frames, it raises the bar
extremely high. Prior work (mentioned above) demonstrates
that a skilled adversary, under highly controlled stationary
conditions, can sometimes succeed in eavesdropping on the
data signal of simple protocols. Our analytic results demonstrate that it is theoretically possible for sophisticated adversaries to eavesdrop on a complex protocol like Wi-Fi, if they
are located within a few centimeters, and if all components
are stationary, although it has not been demonstrated with
actual hardware.
Furthermore, although the geometry of nearby devices or
multipath effects might result in a full-Rank channel matrix,
the increased Rank is only useful if the receiver is able to
estimate the channel accurately. Our own experience shows
that beyond 6 cm single-antenna COTS receivers simply did
not detect incoming frames in the presence of jamming and
thus made no channel estimate at all. A more sophisticated
adversary may continuously monitor the channel trying to detect frames and accurately estimate the channel. This task is
particularly challenging because at least one of CloseTalker’s
devices are mobile, making it difficult to accurately assess
the channel a priori, and the data is usually transferred in
a single frame – giving the adversary only one chance to
succeed!
Similarly, an adversary with an unlawfully powerful transmitter and directional antenna may be able to inject frames,
but this is not possible with consumer-grade electronics.
While it is therefore not impossible for adversary to eavesdrop
or inject frames, CloseTalker significantly “raises the bar” an
adversary must overcome while still allowing unaltered legitimate target devices to recover data.

8

RELATED WORK

CloseTalker securely transfers data among devices in close
proximity using jamming. Prior research has looked at accomplishing the same goal with various techniques.

8.1

Cryptography

Many approaches involve cryptographic mechanisms, such as
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Despite impressive mathematics, Diffie-Hellman and related approaches have been shown
to be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [1]. Other approaches build on public-key cryptography, which relies on a
trusted certificate authority and may not be computationally
feasible for many embedded devices common in some IoT
environments.

8.2

Out-of-band communications

Out-of-band communication systems exchange a secret key
between devices over a secondary communication channel
that is impervious to observation and interference by an
adversary. The devices then bootstrap a secure connection
over the primary channel using the information exchanged
over the secondary channel. Proposed secondary channels
have included visual [19], audio [21], gesture [35], or secondary
radios such as NFC or RFID. In each of these cases an
additional sensor (light sensor, microphone, accelerometer,
or second radio) is required. That required sensor or radio
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8.5

Jamming and proximity

will not be present on many devices. Additionally, NFC has
been shown to be vulnerable to interception at much longer
distances than originally thought [36]. CloseTalker uses the
in-band Wi-Fi radio and does not require additional sensors,
radios, or complicated algorithms. As noted in Section 1
though, CloseTalker could be used to share a secret that
can be used to bootstrap a long-term, long-distance, fullbandwidth session between devices.

One approach that uses both jamming and proximity is a
system called Shield [12]. Shield uses a necklace-worn friendly
jammer to protect a nearby implanted medical devices from
accepting outside commands. CloseTalker, however, addresses
a different problem in that it conveys information to a target device rather than preventing the target from receiving
potentially malicious data.

8.3

9

Jamming

As the number of deployed IoT devices grows, users will find
it increasingly cumbersome to establish secure relationships
among devices, particularly for brief, ad hoc communications.
Manual entry of secret keys on each device will simply not
scale. To help alleviate that problem, we designed, implemented, and evaluated a system called CloseTalker, which
leverages multiple antennas and the physics of near-field radio
to ensure wireless devices in close physical proximity can securely communicate while more distant devices cannot recover
the information transmitted. CloseTalker works irrespective
of device type or manufacturer and without additional hardware, out-of-band channels, complicated computation, or
manual configuration. In fact, because CloseTalker conforms
to the Wi-Fi standard, the receiving device need not even be
aware that the sender is using CloseTalker’s techniques. We
show that by using the BPSK 1/2 modulation coding scheme,
CloseTalker is able to reliably and securely transfer data
at ranges of 5 cm or less while preventing adversaries from
receiving the data. CloseTalker is perfect for quick exchanges
of data between mobile or IoT devices, leveraging physical
proximity to establish secure device relations consistent with
user intent. This same capability allows CloseTalker to share
address and key information that can bootstrap a long-term,
long-distance, full-bandwidth connection over conventional
protocols, when desired.

Jamming has been well studied as a means of covering inband communication. While there are many uses for jamming,
“friendly jamming” attempts to use jamming to assist with
a purpose like data transfer. More information on friendly
jamming can be found in a recent comprehensive survey
covering 182 academic papers [2]. For example, Kuo et al.
proposed a solution for imparting secret keys onto IoT-type
devices. They suggest putting devices into a Faraday cage
to exchange information and use a jammer to cover any RF
leakage from the cage [18]. This approach may work for small
devices but is impractical for large ones. Several papers use
cooperating relay nodes to jam and prevent eavesdroppers
from decoding network traffic over large distances [4, 7, 10, 22].
CloseTalker does not rely on additional “helper” devices.
Other researchers consider remote jamming, where unlike
CloseTalker, the data source and jammer are located a large
distance apart or have a pre-shared key [28–30, 33, 34, 37].
Another friendly-jamming survey by Huo et al. segregated
approaches on three criteria: (1) non-self cooperative jamming (where additional devices aid the jamming) versus selfcooperative jamming (where the only legitimate devices are
the transmitter and receiver), (2) uniform (omni-directional)
versus directional jamming (jamming is beam-formed to keep
the receiver free of jamming), and (3) perfect versus imperfect
knowledge of eavesdroppers CSI. None of the papers listed
in their survey take CloseTalker’s approach. All of those approaches rely on either additional helper devices, directional
jamming, or perfect knowledge of an eavesdropper’s CSI.

8.4

CONCLUSION
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Proximity

Like CloseTalker, other approaches to secure data transfer
rely on proximity between devices. ProxiMate, for instance,
uses fluctuations in television or FM radio broadcast signals
to develop a common key between devices located within onehalf wavelength of each other [20]. CloseTalker can securely
transfer arbitrary data, not just a key. Separately, a project
called Wanda exploits the difference in signal strength between two nearby antennas to securely transmit data to a
target device [24]. Wanda, however, can only transmit one
bit with each Wi-Fi packet, whereas CloseTalker can send
a much larger data payload – 2,304 bytes in each Wi-Fi
packet [15] – making it more than 18,000 times faster than
Wanda! Furthermore, CloseTalker expands Wanda’s security
protection by adding jamming and by shortening the period
of communication.
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Drew Springall, Emmanuel Thomé, Luke Valenta, Benjamin VanderSloot, Eric Wustrow, Santiago Z. Béguelin, and Paul Zimmermann. Imperfect forward secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman fails in
practice. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS), pages 5–17. ACM, 2015.

351

Session 7: Too Close for Comfort

MobiSys ’19, June 17–21, 2019, Seoul, Korea

[21] Markus Miettinen, N. Asokan, Thien D. Nguyen, Ahmad-Reza
Sadeghi, and Majid Sobhani. Context-based zero-interaction pairing and key evolution for advanced personal devices. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS), pages 880–891. ACM, November 2014.
[22] Rohit Negi and Satashu Goel. Secret communication using artificial noise. In IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, page 19.
IEEE, 2005.
[23] Panda Wireless. Panda Ultra Wireless N USB Wi-Fi adapter,
http://www.pandawireless.com, visited 4/15/2018.
[24] Timothy J. Pierson, Xiaohui Liang, Ronald Peterson, and David
Kotz. Wanda: securely introducing mobile devices. In Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), pages 1–9. IEEE, April 2016.
[25] Timothy J. Pierson, Travis Peters, Ronald Peterson, and David
Kotz. Poster: Proximity detection with single-antenna IoT devices. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Mobile
Computing and Networking (MobiCom), pages 663–665. ACM,
2018.
[26] Gill Press.
Internet Of Things (IoT) Predictions,
https://tinyurl.com/ybe99l5m, visited 4/15/2018.
[27] Theodore S. Rappaport. Wireless communications: principles
and practice. Prentice Hall, 2002.
[28] A. Sheikholeslami, D. Goeckel, and H. Pishro-Nik. Jamming based
on an ephemeral key to obtain everlasting security in wireless
environments. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
14(11):6072–6081, Nov 2015.
[29] W. Shen, P. Ning, X. He, and H. Dai. Ally friendly jamming: How
to jam your enemy and maintain your own wireless connectivity
at the same time. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S & P), pages 174–188, May 2013.
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